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1. Introduction:	Wither	Law?	
	
	
In	the	space	of	a	few	short	years,	the	People’s	Republic	of	China	has	transformed	
itself	from	villain	to	hero,	the	world’s	leading	hope	for	avoiding	anthropogenic	
climactic	disaster.	Notwithstanding	its	position	as	the	world’s	leading	emitter	–	its	
emissions	being	roughly	double	that	of	the	second	placed	USA1	–	China’s	embrace	of	
the	Paris	Agreement,	reaffirmed	in	the	light	of	Trump	Presidency;2	its	pilot	emissions	
trading	schemes;	and	a	vast	renewables	push	have	placed	it	in	a	position	of	great	
global	moment.	Against	the	backdrop	of	European	Union	peripherality	and	troubling	
signals	from	the	post-Obama	USA,	there	is	a	great	burden	on	China	to	demonstrate	
leadership	in	climate	action.			
	
Seen	in	this	light,	carbon	capture	and	storage	serves	as	a	particular	instance	of	the	
general	phenomenon	of	China	as	at	the	centre	of	climate	change	debates.	China’s	
energy	system	alone	accounts	for	nearly	half	of	the	world’s	existing	coal-fired	power	
plants,	and	its	first	NDC	plans	for	its	emissions	to	peak	only	around	2030,	well	past	
the	date	by	which	1.5C	degree	warming	will	have	been	reached.	Notwithstanding	
this	framing,	the	awe-inspiring	numbers	of	China’s	climate	challenge	can	be	cast	in	
an	optimistic	light.	Retrofitting	CCS	to	the	Chinese	coal	power	assets	will	contribute	
to	the	reversal	of	the	“‘lock-in’	of	emissions”,	as	well	as	easing	the	domestic	
economic	and	social	costs	of	premature	closure	of	the	fleet.3	From	a	wider	
perspective,	if	China	were	to	deploy	CCS,	even	if	slowly	at	first,	such	is	its	scale	and	
networked	system	of	governance	that	more	rapid	diffusion	could	push	CCS	past	
thresholds	of	cost,	technology,	social	acceptance,	governance	etc,	with	the	effect	
that	a	tipping	point	is	reached.4	As	such,	the	scale	of	China’s	climate	change	
challenges	contains	within	it	the	possibility	to	transform	the	demonstration	and	
deployment	of	CCS	globally.		
	
What	though	is	the	role	of	law	in	this	process?	China’s	extant	CCS	regulatory	regime	
is	profoundly	underdeveloped.5	As	such,	this	chapter	places	that	regime,	such	as	it	is,	
in	the	context	of	domestic	environmental	law	but	also	larger	debates	about	
understanding	the	nature	of	law	in	legal	systems	which,	unlike	those	in	the	West,	do																																																									1	As	of	2015,	China’s	emissions	(10,357MtCO2)	were	nearly	double	of	the	United	States	(5,414MtCO2),	the	
second	largest	emitter	in	the	world,	and	over	¼	of	the	global	total	(36,262MtCO2).	See	TA	Boden,	G	Marland,	and	
RJ	Andres,	‘Global,	Regional,	and	National	Fossil-Fuel	CO2	Emissions:	Carbon	Dioxide	Information	Analysis	Center	
(CDIAC),	Oak	Ridge	National	Laboratory’,	accessed	via	the	Tyndall	Centre’s	Global	Carbon	Atlas,	at	
<http://www.globalcarbonatlas.org/>	(accessed	4	January	2017).	2	Pilita	Clark,	‘China	Pledges	to	Uphold	Paris	Climate	Commitments’	Financial	Times	(29	March	2017).	3	OECD/IEA,	20	Years	of	Carbon	Capture	and	Storage:	Accelerating	Future	Deployment	(Organisation	for	
Economic	Co-operation	and	Development	2016).	4	See	generally,	Geoffrey	Heal	and	Howard	Kunreuther,	‘Tipping	Climate	Negotiations’	in	Robert	W	Hahn	and	
Alistair	Ulph	(eds),	Climate	Change	and	Common	Sense:	Essays	in	Honour	of	Tom	Schelling	(OUP	Oxford	2012).		5	Xu	Zhaofeng	and	others,	‘Guidelines	for	Safe	and	Effective	Carbon	Capture	and	Storage	in	China’	(2011)	4	
Energy	Procedia	5966.	
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not	give	primacy	to	the	professionalization	of	law.	It	will	be	argued	that	
notwithstanding	major	efforts	of	legal	reform	(i.e.	consistency	of	law,	rights-based	
normativity,	restructuring	of	the	legal	system)6	China’s	climate	governance,	legal	
norms	and	institutions	contribute	and	safeguard	only	partially	the	proper	future	of	
Chinese	CCS.	Moreover,	such	is	the	character	of	the	Chinese	legal	system,	any	role	it	
does	play	bears	little	resemblance	with	governance	regimes	in	other	jurisdictions.	
	
From	the	first,	it	should	be	noted	that	China	current	lacks	a	comprehensive	legal	
regime	for	climate	action.	Surveys	undertaken	by	non-lawyers	such	as	the	Global	
Climate	Legislation	Study	make	clear	that	there	is	no	comprehensive	climate	change	
law	in	China.7	This	is	despite	the	pledge	made	in	2010	for	such	a	legal	regime,	and	
the	optimistic	thought	that	“passage	of	the	law	is	expected	in	2015	or	2016”8	–	the	
wait	is	ongoing.	There	is	of	course	no	denying	that	successive	bureaucratic	edicts	
from	China’s	11th	Five-Year	Plan	(2006)	onwards	have	promised	economy-wide	
reductions	in	carbon	intensity,	which	have	been	followed	up	by	policies	and	
measures	to	meet	said	targets.	The	powerful	National	Development	and	Reform	
Commission	(NDRC	–	the	leading	economic	planning	unit	of	central	government,	
dubbed	the	‘Little	State	Council’)	has	developed	a	National	Plan	to	Address	Climate	
Change	(2014-2020),	and	carbon	pricing	schemes	and	measures	for	energy	demand	
and	supply	abound.9	All	such	policies,	measures,	and	schemes	have	been	formalized	
into	China’s	NDC	under	the	Paris	Agreement.10	What	many	of	these	analyses	fail	to	
do	however	is	to	focus	on	the	legal	nature	of	the	instruments	in	question.	For	
example,	the	GLOBE	study	lists	under	“China:	legislative	portfolio”	genuine	legal	
measures	such	as	the	Renewable	Energy	Act	(2006)	and	Energy	Conservation	Law	
(1997),	along	with	the	12th	Five-Year	Plan	for	the	Development	of	National	Economy	
and	Society	(2011).	Whereas	China	does	indeed	have	a	substantial	body	of	
environmental	law	properly	so-called	(discussed	at	XX	below),	the	regulation	of	
climate	action	is	dominated	by	‘Plans’,	‘Strategies’,	and	other	measures	of	
questionable	legal	provenance.	
	
This	deficiency	extends	to	the	regulation	of	CCS.	China	lacks	both	a	dedicated	CCS	
regulatory	regime	(on	the	EU	model)	and	the	necessary	array	of	CCS-oriented		
provisions	bolted	onto	existing	schemes	for	environmental	protection,	geological	
storage	etc,	as	seen	in		oil	and	gas	legislation	in	Australia	and	Canada.11	The																																																									6	Chris	Thornhill,	A	Sociology	of	Transnational	Constitutions:	Social	Foundations	of	the	Post-National	Legal	
Structure	(Cambridge	University	Press	2016)	PAGE?.	7	M	Nachmany	and	others,	‘Climate	Change	Legislation	in	China’,	The	2015	GLOBE	Climate	Legislation	Study:	A	
Review	of	Climate	Change	Legislation	in	99	Countries	(GLOBE	International	and	the	Grantham	Research	Institute,	
London	School	of	Economics	2015)	2.	8	ibid.	9	For	surveys	of	general	climate	change	measures,	see	generally	Xi	Wang	and	others,	‘Research	and	Scholarship	
on	Climate	Change	Law	in	Developing	Countries’	in	Daniel	A	Farber	and	Marjan	Peeters	(eds),	Encyclopedia	of	
Environmental	Law:	Climate	Change	Law,	vol	1	(Edward	Elgar	Publishing	Ltd	2016);	Alex	L	Wang,	‘Climate	Change	
Policy	and	Law	in	China’	in	Kevin	R	Gray,	Cinnamon	P	Carlarne	and	Richard	Tarasofsky	(eds),	The	Oxford	
Handbook	of	International	Climate	Change	Law	(Oxford	University	Press	2016).	10	http://www4.unfccc.int/ndcregistry/Pages/Home.aspx		11	Deborah	Seligsohn	and	others,	‘CCS	in	China:	Toward	an	Environmental,	Health,	and	Safety	Regulatory	
Framework’	[2010]	WRI	Issue	Brief	6-7.	See	further	the	chapters	by	Gibbs	(Australia)	and	Krupa	(Canada)	in	this	
volume.	
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consequence	of	the	legal	lacunae	in	which	CCS	finds	itself	in	China	are	two-fold.	
Firstly,	the	environmental	regulation	of	CCS	falls	back	onto	the	general	
environmental	law	governing	environmental	protection,	EIAs,	air	pollution	and	so	
on.	This	is	in	itself	hardly	problematic.	Other	CCS	regimes,	including	the	EU’s,	make	
linkages	to	existing	environmental	laws	such	as	environmental	assessment	and	
environmental	liability.12	CCS	is	after	all	one	type	of	industrial	project,	which	will	fall	
within	an	extant	legal	structures	relating	to	environmental	protection,	hazardous	
substances,	planning	and	permitting,	and	project	approval	etc.	In	the	case	of	China	
however,	it	is	questionable	whether	the	general	environmental	law	is	capable	of	
bearing	this	burden	efficaciously.	Secondly,	and	relatedly,	as	others	have	noted,	“CCS	
projects	involve	large	investments	and	initially	will	most	likely	originate	from	the	
state-owned	sector	of	the	economy.”13	The	conflicts	of	interest	that	exist	in	the	
regulation	Chinese	State	Owned	Enterprises	(SOEs)	give	ample	doubts	as	to	the	
effectiveness	of	this	mode	of	governance,	not	least	when	the	limitations	of	
enforcement	and	other	governance	considerations	are	taken	into	account.	
	
2. Environmental	Law	in	China	
	
a) Basics	of	the	Chinese	Legal	System	
	
Although	China’s	legal	system	falls	into	the	family	of	‘socialist	law’	in	David’s	classical	
taxonomy,	there	are	reasons	to	doubt	that	this	is	a	helpful	finding.14	As	Mattei	
notes,	this	is	a	classification	that	is	both	Euro-American	centric,	and	fails	to	account	
for	the	success	of	the	Chinese	political	system	and	the	influence	of	legal	sinology.15	A	
more	compelling	approach	he	argues	is	one	which	takes	into	account	and	seeks	to	
unearth	‘hidden	law’,	“the	hidden	assumptions	of	different	legal	systems.”16	In	order	
to	better	arrive	at	this	deeper	view,	Mattei	proposes	his	own,	now	famous,	
classification	of	global	legal	systems.	Rather	than	relying	on	formal	categories	of	
legal	systems	(i.e.	common	law,	civil	law,	socialist	law…),	Mattei’s	categorization	
revolves	around	“three	patterns	of	social	incentives	(or	social	constraints)	which	are	
at	play	in	all	legal	systems	simultaneously.”17	The	categories	of	social	incentives	are	
the	rule	of	professional	law,	the	rule	of	political	law,	and	the	rule	of	traditional	law.	
What	varies	among	the	legal	systems	of	the	world	is	the	“quantity,	acceptability,	and	
most	importantly,	hegemony”	of	these	patterns	of	social	incentives.	The	application	
of	this	approach	has	the	advantage	of	both	being	non-Western-centric,	and	also	
dynamic,	responding	to	developments	as	they	occur.	There	will	of	course	be	
circumstances	in	which	the	distinctions	between	approaches,	i.e.	the	rule	of	political																																																									12	See	further	the	chapter	by	Velcova	on	the	EU	Directive	in	this	volume	13	ibid.	Citing	Al-Juaied,	M.	and	Witmore,	A.,	‘Realistic	Costs	for	Carbon	Capture’	(Belfer	Center	Harvard,	2009).		14	R	David	and	C	Jauffret	Spinosi,	Les	Grands	Systemes	de	Droit	Contemporains	(10th	edn,	1992).	15	Ugo	Mattei,	‘Three	Patterns	of	Law:	Taxonomy	and	Change	in	the	World’s	Legal	System’	(1997)	45	The	
American	Journal	of	Comparative	Law	5,	10.	16	ibid,	13,	citing	Sacco.	17	ibid,	16.	
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law	and	the	rule	of	traditional	law,	will	be	difficult	to	parse,	but	this	is	no	more	than	
a	proper	recognition	of	the	complexities	of	the	task.	In	any	event,	Mattei’s	
conclusion	is	that	China’s	hegenomic	legal	approach	is	traditional,	albeit	with	
notable	“characteristics	of	the	rule	of	political	law.”[43]18	For	context,	this	is	to	be	
contrasted	with	Japan	which	although	also	classified	as	predominantly	traditional,	
has	professional	law	as	its	secondary	pattern	of	social	incentives.	
	
It	should	be	noted	that	Mattei’s	classification	is	not	one	that	is	routinely	adopted	by	
scholars	working	on	China.	A	leading	US	textbook	on	Chinese	law	makes	the	wholly	
Eurocentric	point	that	“China’s	legal	system	is	largely	a	civil	law	system.”19	This	is	of	
course	a	recognition	that,	like	Japan’s,	it	is	a	system	that	has	drawn	very	heavily	on	
the	German	legal	system	which	has	been	grafted,	far	from	unproblematically,	onto	
Confucian	systems	of	the	state,	authority	and	value.20	Nonetheless,	many	of	the		
abstract	features	identified	by	Mattei	–	of	the	interplay	between	traditional,	politics,	
and	professionalization	–	are	vividly	present	in	the	actual	law	making	processes	of	
the	PRC.		
	
China’s	law-making	process	is	governed	by	the	Constitution	(1954)	and	the	
Legislation	Law	(2000).21	Although	law-making	must	respect	concepts	such	as	‘the	
socialist	road’,	democratic	dictatorship	by	the	people,	Marxism,	Leninism,	and	
thoughts	of	Mao	Zedong	among	other,	the	Constitution	vests	all	the	political	power	
in	the	national	government.22	The	highest	legislative	organ	of	the	People’s	Republic	
of	China	is	the	National	People’s	Congress	(NPC),	and	its	Standing	Committee	adopts	
national	environmental	laws.		
	
The	State	Council	is	China’s	highest	‘executive’	and	‘state	administration’	body,	and	
oversees	all	the	ministries	and	commissions.23	Its	functions	include	promulgating	the	
regulations	necessary	to	implement	national	laws	passed	by	the	NPC	or	its	Standing	
Committee.		The	State	Council	is	formally	subordinate	to	the	NPC	but	in	reality	
operates	relatively	independently	from	it,	and	can	create	a	bottleneck	for	laws	
waiting	for	implementing	regulations.24	Critically,	it	is	constitutionally	tasked	to	draw	
up	China’s	Five	Year	Plans	which	is	drafted	by	the	National	Development	and	Reform	
Commission	(NDRC),25	although	its	“broad	themes	and	goals…are	developed	by	the	
																																																								18	ibid.	19	Daniel	CK	Chow,	The	Legal	System	of	the	People’s	Republic	of	China	(3rd	edn,	West	Academic	Publishing	
2015).	20	PR	Luney,	‘Traditions	and	Foreign	Influences:	Systems	of	Law	in	China	and	Japan’	(1989)	52	Law	and	
Contemporary	Problems	129.	21	Charles	McElwee,	Environmental	Law	in	China:	Mitigating	Risk	and	Ensuring	Compliance	(Oxford	University	
Press	2011)	44.	See	respectively,	http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Constitution/node_2825.htm		and	
http://english1.english.gov.cn/laws/2005-08/20/content_29724.htm	.	22	Articles	9,	22	and	26	of	the	Constitution.	23	McElwee	(n	13)	41.	24	McElwee	(n	13)	78	n4.	25	The	NDRC	is	“China’s	most	important	economic	planning	body”,	and	is	also	in	charge	of	China’s	response	to	
climate	change,	is	China’s	Designated	National	Authority	under	the	Kyoto	Protocol,	and	played	a	major	role	in	
drafting	China’s	climate	change	“white	paper”	released	in	2008	-	ibid.	92-4.	
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Communist	Party	of	China	(CPC)	Central	Committee.”26	The	role	of	the	Five	Year	
Plans	(FYP)	is	essential	to	note.	These	are	the	pivotal	policy	documents	in	China,	
declaring	and	setting	the	China’s	economy	policies,	objectives,	and	long	term	
direction.	Where	it	is	deemed	necessary	and	appropriate,	the	Plans	are	
supplemented	by	NPC	legislation,	and	ministerial	policy.27		
	
As	regards	environmental	lawmaking	specifically,	the	NPC	has	a	number	of	special	
committees,	one	of	which	is	the	Environment	and	Natural	Resources	Protection	
Committee	(ENRPC).28	Similarly,	the	State	Council	has	sub-units	with	cross-
ministerial	tasks,	such	as	the	Legislative	Affairs	Office	that	also	has	an	Environmental	
Protection	Department.29	As	environmental	protection	does	not	fall	within	exclusive	
competence	of	either	the	NPC	or	its	Standing	Committee,	it	can	be	legislated	by	the	
NPC	and	the	State	Council	and	its	ministries.30	
	
For	those	who	view	‘law’	through	the	lens	of	western	conceptions	of	the	rule	of	law	
(a	rough	approximation	for	Mattei’s	rule	of	professional	law),	the	Chinese	approach	
bears	only	a	slight	resemblance	to	a	system	of	generally	applicable	rules	applied	
impartially,	and	enforceable	via	independent	courts.31	Essential	to	note	is	the	role	of	
the	Communist	Party	of	China	(CPC).	Although	it	formally	derives	no	power	from	the	
Constitution,	and	has	only	a	limited	role	in	the	law-making	process,32	it	is	the	de	
facto	highest	power	in	the	country.	Its	National	Party	Congress	is	charged	with	
formulating	the	basic	orientation	of	the	Party,	and	the	Politburo	of	its	Central	
Committee	determines	all	key	policy	decisions	and	appointments.33	Furthermore,	
the	Third	Plenum	of	the	Central	Committee	usually	introduces	the	new	Party	
leadership’s	broad	economic	and	political	reforms.34	A	separate	issue	arises	from	the	
dispersal	of	legislative	authority.35	The	“lines	of	authority”	are	often	unclear,	within	
consequent	uncertainties	over	whether	given	entities	are	act	within	their	vires.36	
Peerenboom	describes	the	legislative	processes	as	lacking	in	transparency,	but	also	
with	a	high	degree	of	inconsistency	between	lower	and	superior	legislation,	as	well	
as	problems	surrounding	the	publication	and	accessibility	of	laws.37	
	
																																																									26	ibid.	72.	27	Chow	(n	18).	28	McElwee	(n	20)	35-6.	29	ibid	42.	30	ibid	45.	31	See	generally,	Jeremy	Waldron,	‘The	Rule	of	Law’	in	Edward	N	Zalta	(ed),	The	Stanford	Encyclopedia	of	
Philosophy	(Fall	2016,	Metaphysics	Research	Lab,	Stanford	University	2016).	32	RP	Peerenboom,	China’s	Long	March	toward	Rule	of	Law	(Cambridge	University	Press	2002)	240.	33	Colin	Mackerras,	Donald	Hugh	McMillen	and	Andrew	Watson,	Dictionary	of	the	Politics	of	the	People’s	
Republic	of	China	(Routledge	1998)	66-8.	34	“Introduction	to	China’s	Plenary	Sessions	and	the	CPC	Central	Committee”	China	Briefing	(November	11,	
2013)	http://www.china-briefing.com/news/2013/11/11/introduction-to-chinas-plenary-sessions-and-the-cpc-
central-committee.html		35	Peerenboom	(n	31)	240.	36	ibid.	241.	37	ibid.	245.	
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b) Environmental	Law	Making,	and	Enforcement	
	
	
In	February	1978	the	Chinese	Constitution	was	amended	to	provide	an	explicit	
requirement	of	environmental	protection	–	the	current	Article	2638	–	and	shortly	
thereafter	established	an	ideological	basis	for	the	State	to	fulfil	its	constitutional	
environmental	obligations.39	The	development	of	modern	Chinese	environmental	
laws	commenced	in	September	1979	with	the	introduction	of	the	Environmental	
Protection	Law	of	the	People’s	Republic	of	China.40	Legislative	development	has	
been	rapid	thereafter,	and	according	to	Wang	the	Environmental	Protection	Law	
took	precedence	over	other	areas	of	law,	such	as	economic	construction.41	This	is	
partly	due	to	the	increasingly	serious	environmental	problems	that	the	nation	had	
faced	since	the	late	1950s,	which	were	exacerbated	during	the	Cultural	Revolution.42	
In	this	formative	period	of	the	Republic,	economic	growth	was	prioritised	over	
environmental	protection,	which	were	in	turn	marginalised.43	An	awareness	on	the	
part	of	the	leadership	of	the	public	harm	caused	by	industrialisation	in	the	West	and	
Japan	was	also	a	contributory	factor	in	the	formulation	of	the	new	regime.44	
	
	
In	the	same	period,	the	Leading	Group	of	Environmental	Protection	in	the	State	
Council	(LGEPSC)	prepared	policy	instructions	for	cadres45	providing	that	the	
“elimination	of	pollution	and	protection	of	the	environment	were	a	part	of	building	
socialism	and	realising	the	four	modernisations	enacted	by	Deng	Xiaoping.”46	As	
McElwee	demonstrates	however,	the	effect	of	myriad	mergers	and	administrative	
reforms	of	the	LGEPSC,	including	renaming	as	the	Environmental	Protection	Bureau	
and	subsequently	the	State	Environmental	Protection	Administration	(SEPA),	served	
weakened	it	and	proved	to	be	a	setback	for	environmental	protection.47	Since	2008	
however,	SEPA	was	renamed	the	Ministry	of	Environmental	Protection,	and	its	
																																																								38	“The	state	protects	and	improves	the	living	environment	and	the	ecological	environment,	and	prevents	and	
controls	pollution	and	other	public	hazards.	The	state	organizes	and	encourages	afforestation	and	the	protection	
of	forests.”	See	generally,	Canfa	Wang,	‘The	Rapid	Development	of	Environmental	Protection	Law’	in	Dingjian	Cai	
and	Chenguang	Wang	(eds),	China’s	journey	toward	the	rule	of	law:	legal	reform,	1978-2008	(Brill	2010)	498;	
McElwee	(n	20)	24.	39	Wang	(n	37)	499.	40	As	amended,	http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/12/content_1383917.htm	.	Formally	
implemented	in	1989.	41	Wang	(n	37)	496.	42	ibid.	43	Pitman	B	Potter,	China’s	Legal	System	(Polity	Press	2013)	40-41,	155.	44	Wang	(n	37)	497-8.	45	Roughly	equivalent	to	a	civil	service	–	see	A	Doak	Barnett,	Cadres,	Bureaucracy,	and	Political	Power	in	
Communist	China	(Columbia	University	Press	1967).	46	McElwee	(n	20)	25.	47	ibid	25-8.	
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minister	has	gained	membership	of	the	State	Council.	As	a	corollary	its	status	has	
been	elevated	to	the	highest	level	of	national	administrative.48	
	
The	Environmental	Protection	Law	serves	as	a	framework	law,	providing	principles	,	
establishing	an	administrative	system	for	protection	and	a	legal	basis	for	the	
development	of	various	environmental	protection	institutions,	and	providing	the	
system	for	implementation	of	environmental	management.49	The	latter	includes	the	
requirement	that	environmental	protection	efforts	are	to	be	implemented	during	
the	design,	construction	and	operation	of	industrial	facilities.	Along	with	
environmental	impact	assessment	and	emission	fees,	this	serves	as	the	basis	of	
environmental	management	systems	in	China.50	Under	this	framework,	the	NPC	has	
promulgated	nine	environmental	protection	laws,	and	the	State	Council	enacted	
over	fifty	administrative	regulations.51	In	addition,	over	six	hundred	rules	and	
regulations	have	been	issued	by	the	departments	of	the	State	Council,	and	other	
subordinate	congresses	and	governments	to	implement	the	said	laws	and	
administrative	regulations.52	
	
In	the	cognate	area	of	energy	law,	so	critical	for	CCS,	the	Chinese	government	has	
been	regulating	for	broad	environmental	ends	for	decades.	As	early	as	1980,	the	
government	established	multi-levelled	bureaucratic	roles,	including	within	state-
owned	enterprises	specifically	for	the	purpose	of	energy	conservation.	Notably	
though,	as	noted	by	Wang,	this	was	achieved	not	through	positive	law	but	was	
rather	“direct	government	intervention	by	means	of	administrative	plan	and	
order.”53	Nor	is	this	a	historical	anomaly	–	the	Energy	Conservation	Law	(2007)54	is	
judged	to	be	“mostly	a	policy	declaration	and	policy	framework	with	weak	operative	
nature	[with]	few	punitive	measures	to	deal	with	violations	[and]	governmental	
authorities	having	too	much	discretion	in	their	functions	of	macro-regulatory	and	
administrative	supervision.”55	Furthermore,	as	Wang	patiently	demonstrates,	such	
“defects	and	deficiencies”	[p	398]	are	endemic	in	fields	beyond	energy	conservation	
law.	The	Renewable	Energy	Law	2005	displays	many	such	characteristics.	After	
noting	the	widespread	role	of	civil	society	organisations	in	formulating	and	enforcing	
environmental	law,	and	of	citizens’	rights	of	information	and	participation,	it	is	noted	
that	although	Article	9	of	the	Renewable	Energy	Law	requires	that	opinions	be	
sought	from	inter	alia	the	general	public,	“the	provision	is	not	operational	but	a	
declaration	of	policy.”	[p	394]	Although	others	take	a	less	critical	stance	on	
																																																								48	ibid	29.	49	Wang	(n	37)	500-1.	50	ibid.	51	Chenxia	Shi,	‘Directors’	Duties	and	Liabilities	in	China :	Enforcement	Difficulties	in	Protecting	Investors	and	
Other	Corporate	Stakeholders’,	Political	determinants	of	corporate	governance	in	China	(Routledge	2012)	182.	52	ibid.	53	Wang	(n	37)	385.		54	http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/11/content_1383579.htm	55	Wang	Mingyuan,	‘China’s	Plight	in	Moving	Towards	a	Low-Carbon	Future:	Analysis	from	the	Perspective	of	
Energy	Law’	in	Donald	N	Zillman	and	others	(eds),	Beyond	the	carbon	economy:	energy	law	in	transition	(Oxford	
University	Press	2008)	385-6.	
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environmentally-related	public	engagement	in	China,56		further	examples	of	the	
shortcomings	of	Chinese	environmental	law	abound.		
	
A	detailed	analysis	of	the	shortcomings	of	Chinese	enforcement	of	environmental	
regulations,	with	a	focus	on	the	institutional	framework	by	which	regulations	are	
enforced,	comes	from	Andrews-Speed.	His	closely	observed	work	on	the	closely	
related	fields	of	energy	policy	and	regulation	(specifically,	the	regulation	of	township	
and	village	coalmines),	identifies	two	basic	institutional	challenges,	“the	ever-
changing	structure	of	government	[and]	the	opaque,	heterogeneous	and	ambiguous	
nature	of	government	functions	in	China.”57	There	is,	he	observes,	a	hierarchically	
organized	set	of	environmental	agencies,	bureaus	and	offices	ranging	from	central	
government	to	township,	as	well	as	a	significant	overlapping	of	responsibilities.58	
The	consequent	“inadequate	implementation	and	direct	obstruction”	are	
predictable,	and	are	supplemented	by	“the	sheer	number	of	vertical	reporting	lines	
[and]	the	overlap	or	duplication	of	roles	amongst	different	agencies.”59	The	
conclusion	that	the	regulatory	system	has	been	“largely	ineffective	[and]	
characterized	by	an	ever-growing	weight	of	laws	and	regulations	and	a	highly	
complicated	administrative	structure”	bodes	ill	for	the	broader	character	of	energy	
and	environmental	regulation	as	the	“higher	levels	of	government	are	prevented	
from	achieving	their	policy	goals	by	policy	modification,	inadequate	implementation	
and	direct	obstruction	at	intermediate	and	lower	levels	of	government.”60	In	
Andrew-Speed’s	estimation,	not	only	are	such	outcomes	typical	of	Chinese	
regulatory	systems,	but	“in	the	energy	and	natural	resources	sectors	the	negative	
impact	of	such	administration	is	particularly	pronounced.”61  
	
	
c) The	Turn	to	the	Climate	
	
Although	China	ratified	the	UNFCCC	from	the	first,	and	has	been	engaged	in	its	
negotiations	ever	since,	domestic	climate	change	action	did	not	immediately	follow.	
In	the	decade	or	so	from	1992,	China’s	primary	policy	goal	was	its	development	
strategy	and	annual	economic	growth	of	10%.	To	the	extent	that	environmental	
concerns	were	articulated	in	major	policy	processes,	they	were	manifested	in	the	
form	of	sustainable	development	planning.	As	early	as	1994	China’s	Agenda	21:	
White	Paper	on	China’s	Population,	Environment	and	Development	in	the	21st	
Century	explicitly	stated	the	wish	to	control	GHG	emissions	for	purposes	of	climate	
																																																								56	Qiuyan	Zhao,	‘China’s	Emerging	Regulatory	Framework	for	Safe	and	Effective	CCS,	2011-15’	in	Ian	Havercroft,	
Richard	Macrory	and	Richard	B	Stewart	(eds),	Carbon	Capture	and	Storage:	Emerging	Legal	and	Regulatory	Issues	
(Hart	Publishing	2011)	229.	57	CP	Andrews-Speed,	Energy	Policy	and	Regulation	in	the	People’s	Republic	of	China	(Kluwer	Law	International	
2004)	197.	58	ibid	198.	59	ibid	200.	60	ibid	200–201.	61	ibid	201.		
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change	avoidance,62	in	terms	that	combined	the	tenor	of	the	UNFCCC,	and	post-Rio	
understandings	of	sustainable	development.	Similarly,	the	10th	FYP	(2001-2005)	gives	
great	focus	to	sustainable	development,	including	related	objectives	to,	inter	alia,		
increase	forest	cover,	improve	energy	efficiency,	expand	renewable	energy.	From	
reading	Chinese	scholars	it	seems	to	be	the	case	that	the	policy	commitments	in	
Agenda	21	and	other	policy	documents	of	the	era	were	not	translated	into	law,	
much	less	complied	with	in	spirit.63	
	
However,	from	the	Eleventh	Five	Year	Plan	(2006-2011)	onwards,	a	new	shift	
towards	the	environment	and	climate	concerns	became	clear.	Various	explanations	
can	be	offered	–	the	entry	into	force	of	the	Kyoto	Protocol	and	the	economic	
opportunity	offered	by	the	Clean	Development	Mechanism,	increasing	international	
pressure	for	action	as	China’s	emissions	matched	those	of	the	USA,	as	well	as	the	co-
benefits	for	the	climate	associated	with	the	domestic	priority	of	action	on	air	
pollution	in	China’s	cities.	The	policy	momentum	that	these	Plans	have	given	climate	
action	in	China	has	been	considerable,	ranging	over	fields	as	diverse	as	energy	
efficiency,	adaptation,	the	built	environment,	forest	management,	and	tools	from	
carbon	tariffs	to	trading	schemes.64	
	
While	the	climate	aspects	of	the	FYP	are	closely	connected	with	air	pollution	control	
policies65	contained	in	the	11th	Five	Year	Plan	(2006-2010)66	and	the	12th	Five	Year	
Plan	(2011-2015),67	the	Plans	certainly	have	had	broader	environmental	ambitions.	
As	Na	notes,	the	11th	FYP	was	based	on	the	‘Scientific	Development	Concept’,	
promoted	by	then	President	Hu	Jintao	as	the	guiding	socioeconomic	ideology	of	the	
Communist	Party	of	China.68	At	the	core	of	concept	was	the	goal	of	“environmentally	
friendly	and	energy-efficient	growth”,69	from	which	followed	the	Plan’s	policy	of	
reducing	unit	GDP	intensity	by	20%	by	2010	compared	with	2005,	and	a	10%	
reduction	in	polluted	substances.	Notwithstanding	these	goals,	such	was	the	
‘success’	of	China’s	energy-intensive	industries	that	coal	consumption	actually	
increased	in	this	period.70	The	13th	FYP	is	a	yet	more	ambitious	scheme,	with	yet																																																									62	China’s	Agenda	21	(1994),	ch	18(31-35),	cited	in	Jiang	Xiaoyi,	‘Climate	Change	and	Energy	Law’	in	Tianbao	Qin	
(ed),	Research	handbook	of	Chinese	environmental	law	(Edward	Elgar	Publishing	2015).	63	In	addition	to	Jiang,	see	Mingyuan	(n	54).	Xi	Wang	and	others,	‘Research	and	Scholarship	on	Climate	Change	
Law	in	Developing	Countries’	in	Daniel	A	Farber	and	Marjan	Peeters	(eds),	Encyclopedia	of	Environmental	Law:	
Climate	Change	Law,	vol	1	(Edward	Elgar	Publishing	Ltd	2016),	Na	Sungin,	‘Towards	Sustainable	Development	in	
Developing	Countries:	Achievements	and	Problems	of	a	Clean	Development	Mechanism’	in	Hidenori	Niizawa	and	
Toru	Morotomi	(eds),	Governing	Low-carbon	Development	and	the	Economy	(United	Nations	University	Press	
2014),	amongst	many.	64	Wang	Weiguang	and	Guoguang	Zheng	(eds),	China’s	Climate	Change	Policies	(Routledge	2012).	65	See	generally,	Chris	P	Nielsen	and	Mun	S	Ho	(eds),	Clearer	Skies	Over	China:	Reconciling	Air	Quality,	Climate,	
and	Economic	Goals	(MIT	Press	2013).	66	http://www.gov.cn/english/special/115y_index.htm	accessed	on	21	December	2016	–	focusing	on	sulphur	
control	policies	and	a	carbon	tax.		67	http://english.gov.cn/12thFiveYearPlan/		accessed	on	21	December	2016	–	advancing	carbon	pricing	schemes	
and	in	particular	the	piloting	of	carbon	trading	schemes.	68	Sungin	(n	62)	73.	69	ibid.	70	ibid.	
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deeper	carbon	and	energy	intensity	targets	aimed	at	meeting	its	Paris	Agreement	
pledge	to	reduce	carbon	intensity	60	to	65	percent	by	2030.71	
	
It	should	also	be	noted	that	notwithstanding	a	historically	uneasy	relationship	with	
international	law,72	China	has	engaged	positively	with	the	climate	regime.	This	is	
especially	true	of	the	UNFCCC	negotiations	since	the	Copenhagen	COP	(2009)	which	
marked	a	new	era	of	BASIC	leadership	with	China’s	then	premier	Wen	
Jiabao	and	other	leading	developing	countries	accepting	the	possibility	of	quantified	
emission	reductions,	in	exchange	for	developed	countries	fulfilling	their	
environmental	commitments.73	Arguably	the	Trump	Presidency	will	deepen	this	
process	of	engagement.	Indeed,	it	has	been	argued	that	the	‘America-first’	approach	
of	the	Trump	administration	means	that,	“China	has	an	even	greater	stake	in	
investing	in	international	regimes,	as	well	as	more	room	for	leadership.	It	is	
instructive	that	Beijing’s	immediate	reaction	to	Trump’s	election	was	to	call	for	
reaffirmation	of	commitment	to	the	Paris	climate	change	deal.”74	
	
As	to	the	legal	substance	of	China’s	current	climate	regime,	a	revealing	account	is	
provided	by	Wang.75	It	sets	out	the	various	targets	for	energy	intensity,	
afforestation,	pollution	reduction	etc	laid	down	in	successive	Five	Year	Plans,	the	
wide	range	of	policies	to	adjust	China’s	industrial	structure,	improve	its	energy	
efficiency	and	so	on,	as	well	as	better	known	initiatives	such	as	the	carbon	trading	
pilot	schemes.	What	is	notable	however	about	this	discussion	is	the	admission	that	
“the	proliferation	of	discreet	energy	and	climate-related	plans,	policies,	and	
projects….has	not	relied	on	legislative	authorization.	A	substantial	program	has	
emerged	through	the	state	planning	process	and	related	target	and	policy	
documents.”76	Not	merely	is	there	no	‘climate	change	law’	on	the	model	understood	
in	many	other	jurisdictions,	the	body	of	instruments	understood	as	the	Chinese	
climate	regime	exists	without	any	visible	means	of	legal	support.	Odder	is	Wang’s	
insouciance:	“It	is	unclear	what	function	legislation	and	their	chosen	allocations	of	
authority	would	serve	that	is	not	already	served	by	state	planning…”77	–	a	matter	to	
which	we	will	return	below.	
	
	
	
	 	
																																																								71	See	http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease/201612/P020161207645765233498.pdf		72	See	generally,	Ann	E	Kent,	Beyond	Compliance:	China,	International	Organizations,	and	Global	Security	
(Stanford	University	Press	2007).	73	Lavanya	Rajamani,	‘The	Making	and	Unmaking	of	the	Copenhagen	Accord’	(2010)	59	International	&	
Comparative	Law	Quarterly	824.	74	Kerry	Brown	(ed),	The	Critical	Transition:	China’s	Priorities	for	2021	(Chatham	House	2017)	51.	See	also	Clark	
(n	2).	75	Wang	(n	9).	76	ibid	651.	77	ibid.	
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3. CCS	and	China	
	
	
a) Policy	and	Pilots		
	
	
Given	the	scale	and	industrial	profile	of	the	Chinese	economy,	especially	its	reliance	
on	coal-fired	power	generation,	CCS	is	China	is	mutually	supportive	of	Chinese	
decarbonisation,	as	well	as	global	efforts	at	wide	scale	CCS	deployment.	China’s	
energy	system	alone	accounts	for	nearly	half	of	the	world’s	1,950GW	of	existing	
coal-fired	power	plants78	and	the	role	of	CCS	in	contributing	to	China’s	suite	of	
climate	policies,	and	enabling	them,	has	been	publically	recognised.	In	the	foreword	
to	a	important	2015	report	by	the	Asian	Development	Bank,	the	Deputy	Director	
General	of	the	NDRC’s	Department	of	Climate	Change	discussed	the	urgent	need	“to	
expand	[CCS]	deployment	at	a	rapid	scale	to	meet	priority	emission	reduction	targets	
in	the	short,	medium	and	long-term.”79	In	China,	as	elsewhere,	CCS	deployment	is	a	
condition	precedent	to	the	lowest	cost	deployment	of	other	climate	change	policies.	
For	example,	in	the	IEA’s	Roadmaps,	the	cost	of	meeting	the	450ppm	target	
increases	by	c.40%	without	CCS,	owing	to	the	absence	of	alternatives	to	fossil	fuel	
power	in	industry	sectors	such	as	iron	and	steel,	cement,	chemicals	etc.80		
	
In	recognition	of	the	imperative	of	widespread	CCS	deployment,	China	has	invested	
considerable	policy	energy	in	the	development	of	its	CCS	knowledge	base.	As	Qin	
notes,	China	has	for	a	number	of	years	engaged	in	research	projects,	policy	studies	
and	roadmaps,	pilots,	and	demonstration	projects	on	aspects	of	the	CCS	chain,	
including	the	world's	largest	capture	project	for	coal-fired	power	plants.81	Detailed	
studies	however	have	found	that	the	CCS	regulatory	framework	in	China	to	be	unfit	
for	purpose,	even	when	taking	into	account	the	scope	for	adaptation	of	existing	
laws.82	Although	some	aspects	of	the	regulation	of	the	CCS	chain	hold	out	some	
hope	(prinicipally	those	related	to	industrial	activities),	others	provide	less	scope	for	
building	upon,	primarily	those	related	to	geological	storage.83	
																																																									78	OECD/IEA	(n	3).	79	Asian	Development	Bank,	Roadmap	for	Carbon	Capture	and	Storage	Demonstration	and	Deployment	in	the	
People’s	Republic	of	China	(Asian	Development	Bank	2015)	
<https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/175347/roadmap-ccs-prc.pdf>.	80	For	the	role	of	each	of	the	other	energy	technologies	necessary	to	achieve	the	2050	target,	see	
<www.iea.org/roadmaps>.	81	Tianbao	Qin,	‘Regulation	of	Carbon	Capture	and	Storage	in	China:	Lessons	from	the	EU	CCS	Directive’	in	
Michael	Z	Hou,	Heping	Xie	and	Patrick	Were	(eds),	Clean	Energy	Systems	in	the	Subsurface:	Production,	Storage	
and	Conversion	(Springer	Berlin	Heidelberg	2013)	-	at	Table	7	and	attendant	text.	See	also	Seligsohn	and	others	
(n	11)	Box	2.	82	Seligsohn	and	others	(n	11).	83	ibid	3,	6-9.	
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b) The	Adequacy	of	Amending	Extant	Regimes		
	
Seligsohn	et	al		do	however	survey	the	existing	legal	and	institutional	arrangements	
in	a	variety	of	CCS-relevant	areas	such	as	environmental	standards,	geological	
storage,	regulatory	oversight,	and	health	and	safety.	The	purpose	is	to	explore	the	
scope	for	drawing	upon	these	various	bodies	of	law,	and	attaching	CCS-specific	
provisions	to	them,	in	the	absence	of	a	dedicated	CCS	regime	on	the	EU	model.	In	
many	respects,	this	is	a	promising	exercise,	noting	for	example	that	“China	already	
has	robust	regulations	for	plant	construction	and	air	pollution	that	will	impact	all	CS	
capture	plants	and	form	part	of	the	CCS-specific	regulations…under	the	current	Law	
on	Prevention	and	Control	of	Air	Pollution.”84	Other	areas	however	are	considered	in	
more	neutral	terms	and	the	generic	limitations	of	Chinese	environmental	law	are	
discussion.	In	addition	to	the	shortcomings	discussed	herein,	a	wide	range	of	
regulatory	gaps	are	explored,	the	most	pressing	of	which	are	capture,	
transportation,	and	geological	storage.	To	take	the	first	of	these,	the	water	
consumption	aspects	of	capture	are	not	addressed	in	the	existing	legislation.	For	a	
water	stressed	society	such	as	China,	it	is	vital	therefore	that	the	impact	of	CCS	
plants	on	local	water	supplies	is	adequately	approved	and	monitored.	Whilst	
transportation	regulation	should	be	able	to	draw	on	cognate	schemes	for	oil,	gas,	
and	chemical,	new	CO2	purity	standards	will	be	required	as	well	as	standards	for	
pipeline	materials.		
	
Regarding	geological	storage,	owing	to	the	differences	in	storing	CO2	as	compared	
with	the	existing	storage	regimes	(for	radioactive	pollution,	chemicals,	hazardous	
materials	etc)	a	bespoke	CCS	storage	regime	would	be	required.	There	are	though	
ample	regimes	for	emulation	in	this	respect.	Gibbs	though	has	subjected	this	precise	
issue	to	exacting	scrutiny,	and	developed	criteria	to	examine	the	effective	
enforcement	of	underground	storage	of	CO2.85	The	four	criteria	are:	
	
1) comprehensive	obligations	addressing	the	risks	
2) comprehensive	monitoring	and	verification	(M&V)	requirements	
3) enforcement	mechanisms,	and		
4) clear	allocation	of	roles	and	responsibilities	for	enforcement.	
	
Gibbs	assesses	the	geological	storage	of	CO2	in	five	jurisdictions,	including	China’s	
onshore	regime.	Each	legal	and	regulatory	regime	is	scored	against	each	of	the	four	
criteria,	and	areas	of	potential	improvement	recommended.86	
	
	
	
																																																									84	ibid	7.	85	MK	Gibbs,	‘Effective	Enforcement	of	Underground	Storage	of	Carbon	Dioxide’	(HWL	Ebsworth	Lawyers	2016).	86	ibid	7-8.	
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Gibbs’	scores	(1)	at	2/9	for	China,87	with	Gibbs	agreeing	with	Seligsohn	et	al	that	
while	current	laws	could	be	adapted	for	demonstration	projects,	larger	scale	projects	
would	need	specific	CCS	laws,	particularly	in	respect	of	the	lack	of	technical	and	
management	standards,	efficient	policies	for	information	disclosure	and	public	
engagement,	and	financial	barriers	and	lack	of	efficient	economic	incentivising	
policies	to	cover	the	commerciality	gap.88	Gibbs	identifies	gaps	in	the	application	of	
the	Chinese	EIA	process	to	CCS	projects,	and	the	fact	that	CO2	is	not	a	designated	
pollutant	for	licensing	purposes.89	Accordingly,	while	the	Environmental	Protection	
Law	makes	polluters	liable	for	the	failure	to	control	pollution,	not	classifying	CO2	as	
a	pollutant	makes	it	unclear	whether	such	rules	could	be	enforced	as	regards	CCS.90	
	By	Criterion	(2),	China	similarly	performs	weakly	–	3/9,	principally	due	to	the	
absence	of	technical	and	management	standards	applicable	to	CCS.91	In	a	similar	
fashion	to	Seligsohn,	it	is	noted	that	whilst	other	environmental	regimes	may	
potentially	apply	to	closure	and	long-term	monitoring,	there	are	currently	no	
requirements	applicable	to	CCS.92	Criterion	(3)	also	scores	3/9,	with	Gibbs	noting	the	
inadequacy	of	financial	penalties	for	polluting	which	leads	to	strategic	non-
compliance	as	it	is	frequently	cheaper	to	pollute	and	pay	a	fine	than	abate.	
Furthermore,	with	patchy	enforcement,	pollution	is	often	undertaken	costlessly,	that	
is,	without	the	payment	of	sanctions.93	
	
It	is	of	course	recognised	that	the	Chinese	legal	system	has	available	a	wide	variety	
of	administrative	enforcement	tools	for	environmental	matters,	from	the	issuing	of	
warnings,	and	terminating	licences,	to	fines,	property	seizures	and	mandatory	
shutdowns.	Criminal	sanctions	are	also	available.94	However,	and	as	will	be	discussed	
at	greater	length	in	the	section	below,	the	effectiveness	of	environmental	
enforcement	suffers	from	widespread	local	protectionism,	not	least	since	
enforcement	authorities	are	often	major	shareholders	of	polluting	enterprises,	
which	creates	powerful	conflicts	of	interest.95	Finally,	environmental	laws	often	lack	
clear	obligations,	having	the	character	more	of	policy	statements	or	ideals	than	
binding	norms.96	Many	of	these	shortcomings	have	been	recognised	by	the	State.	
Gibbs	cites	the	2016	acknowledgment	by	the	Environmental	Protection	Minister	of	
issues	with	local	protectionism	and	interference.97	One	response	to	these	problems	
that	is	noted	with	approval	is	the	introduction	of	economic	incentives,	rewarding	
local	government	officials	and	enterprises	who	meet	environmental	targets,	and	
fining	and	criticising	those	who	fail	to	achieve	their	targets.98																																																									87	ibid	30.	88	ibid.	89	ibid.	90	ibid	31-2.	91	ibid	31.	92	ibid.	93	ibid.	94	ibid.	95	ibid	32.	96	ibid.	97	ibid.	98	ibid.	
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Criterion	(4)	–	the	clear	allocation	of	roles	and	responsibilities	for	enforcement	–	is	
scored	1/3.99	As	is	noted	elsewhere	herein,	the	wide	range	of	possibly	applicable	
laws	is	reflected	in	that	a	variety	of	government	bodies	would	be	involved	in	the	
enforcement	activities,	with	uncertainty	as	to	roles	and	responsibilities,	a	problem	
that	has	caused	issues	with	the	enforcement	of	environmental	law	in	the	past.100	
Additionally,	problems	of	resourcing	are	not	uncommon.	The	Ministry	of	
Environmental	Protection	is	reported	to	have	limited	resources,	frequently	leaving	
enforcement	to	local	Environment	Protection	Bureaus.	However,	these	bodies	
themselves	are	also	understaffed,	lacked	authority,	and	are	inevitably	at	risk	of	
regulatory	capture.101	Again,	these	limitations	have	been	acknowledged	by	the	
Minister	for	Environmental	Protection.	
	
In	the	light	of	the	above	it	is	not	surprising	that	China	performs	poorly	in	comparison	
with	other	Asia-Pacific	nations.102	Its	score	of	9	out	of	27	indicates	that	significant	
reform	of	the	regime	is	required	for	Chinese	CCS	enforcement	to	be	effective.	By	
comparison,	the	Australian	Offshore	Regime	scored	25/27,	the	Japanese	and	
Malaysian	Offshore	Regimes	respectively	17/27,	and	12/27.	
	
c) State	Owned	Enterprises	
	
One	further	challenge	of	CCS	in	China	touched	upon	by	Seligsohn	and	others,	but	
deserving	of	greater	attention,	is	that	posed	by	China’s	State	Owned	Enterprises	
(SOEs).103	Given	the	need	for	large	investments	and	familiarity	with	the	operations	of	
the	power	sector,	it	is	a	certainty	that	many	of	the	leading	industrial	actors	involved	
in	CCS	in	China	will	be	SOEs	–	the	Chinese	grid	companies	are	owned	by	the	state	
and	power	generation	is	dominated	by	state-owned	enterprises.104	Indeed,	several	
SOEs	have	considering	large	scale	demonstration	projects,105	and	keys	aspects	of	
CCS	infrastructure,	such	as	the	CO2	pipeline	network	could	be	organized	as	a	fully	
state-owned	enterprise.106	Moreover,	SOEs	have	a	number	of	structural	advantages	
such	as	being	“better	placed	to	manage	risks	than	smaller,	independent	operators,	
and	are	therefore	expected	to	be	involved	in	a	majority	of	the	demonstration	
projects”.107	
																																																									99	ibid	33.	100	ibid.	101	ibid.	102	ibid	2,	14-15,	30.	
103	For	an	early	treatment	of	the	issues,	see	Richard	Macrory,	‘Air	Pollution	and	the	Regulation	of	European	State	
Enterprises:	A	Comparative	Legal	Model’	in	William	Elliott	Butler	(ed),	Yearbook	on	Socialist	Legal	Systems	
(Transnational	Juris	Publications	Inc	1989).	104	Mun	S	Ho,	Zhongmin	Wang	and	Zichao	Yu,	China’s	Power	Generation	Dispatch	(Resources	for	the	Future	
2017)	12-13.	105	Asian	Development	Bank	(n	78)	8.	106	ibid	19.	107	ibid	45.	
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SOEs	are	but	one	of	the	contradictions	within	the	Chinese	state.	Article	15	of	the	
Constitution	describes	its	mode	of	economic	system	as	a	“socialist	market	economy”	
–	a	term	unexplained.	One	of	the	ways	in	which	China	manages	the	tension	between	
these	facts	and	norms	is	via	SOEs,	means	of	protecting	large	parts	of	the	industrial	
sector	from	competition,	while	simultaneously	promoting	market	liberalization.108	
Inevitably	the	relationship	between	the	Chinese	state	and	SOEs	is	a	complex	one,	
mediated	through	SASAC,109	a	commission	of	the	State	Council	functioning	as	a	
supervisory	authority	and	a	holding	company.110	SASAC	is	the	ultimate	shareholder	
of	100-120	core	companies	and	hundreds	of	downstream	subsidiaries	controlled	
through	pyramid	structures.	SOEs	managed	by	SASAC	include	PetroChina,	Shenhua,	
and	the	State	Grid.	Its	control	may	be	direct	or	indirect,	and	it	is	not	unusual	for	SOEs	
to	have	close	links	to	local	governments.111	SASAC	is	one	of	the	groups	that	needed	
to	approve	investment	decisions	for	SOEs,	including	CCS	projects.112	
	
The	Chinese	state	also	has	significant	control	over	the	executives	of	SOEs.	The	
Communist	Party	and	SASAC	share	an	arrangement	to	appoint	and	rotate	leading	
personnel	in	the	spheres	of	business,	government	and	Party.	113	Such	rotation	is	
particularly	common	among	the	senior	executives	of	different	business	groups	in	the	
same	sector.114	State	also	has	control	in	managerial	incentives,	such	as	
compensation.115	Moreover,	success	and	promotion	in	business	brings	
accompanying	rewards	in	the	area	of	politics,	and	vice	versa.116	For	instance,	
number	of	positions	in	elite	government	and	party	bodies	are	reserved	for	leaders	of	
SOEs.117	
	
Of	particular	significance	for	present	circumstances	is	that	the	Chinese	state	has	less	
control	over	SOEs	than	may	be	supposed.	Indeed,	Milhaupt	and	Zheng	conclude	that	
Chinese	state	capitalism	can	be	better	explained	by	capture	of	the	state	than	by	
ownership	of	enterprise.	Large,	successful	firms	exhibit	a	number	of	common	
characteristics:	market	dominance,	receipt	of	state	subsidies,	proximity	to	state	
power,	and	execution	of	the	state’s	policy	objectives.		
	
Instances	of	SOE	capture	of	the	state	are	abound,	with	the	strictures	of	law	routinely	
being	eased	where	the	exigencies	of	a	situation	so	require.	Lin	and	Milhaupt	give	the	
example	of	SASAC	encouraging	SOEs	to	collaborate	in	overseas	projects	so	as	to																																																									108	Christopher	A	McNally	(ed),	China’s	Emergent	Political	Economy:	Capitalism	in	the	Dragon’s	Lair	(1	edition,	
Routledge	2007)	3-17.	109	State-Owned	Asset	Supervision	and	Administration	Commission	of	the	State	Council,	http://en.sasac.gov.cn/	110	Curtis	J	Milhaupt	and	Wentong	Zheng,	‘Beyond	Ownership:	State	Capitalism	and	the	Chinese	Firm’	(2015)	
103	Georgetown	Law	Journal	665;	Li-Wen	Lin	and	Curtis	J	Milhaupt,	‘We	Are	the	(National)	Champions:	
Understanding	the	Mechanisms	of	State	Capitalism	in	China’	(2013)	65	Stanford	Law	Review	697.	111	Lin	and	Milhaupt	(n	108)	725,	734.	112	Seligsohn	and	others	(n	11)	20.	113	Milhaupt	and	Zheng	(n	108)	677;	Lin	and	Milhaupt	(n	108)	707,	737,	741.	114	Milhaupt	and	Zheng	(n	108)	677;	Lin	and	Milhaupt,	740	115	ibid.680	116	Lin	and	Milhaupt	(n	108)	707	117	ibid.	726-727	
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increase	global	competitiveness.	Whilst	such	activities	undoubtedly	raised	antitrust	
concerns	under	the	Chinese	Antitrust	Law,	“SASAC-supervised	enterprises	have	been	
virtually	exempt	from	antitrust	enforcement”.118	Concerns	of	this	nature	inevitably	
raise	the	question	of	whether	the	intimate	relations	between	SOEs	and	the	State	
constitute	a	corruption	problem	–	discussed	below.	
	
4. The	Problem	of	Law	and	the	Environment	in	China	
a) Legal	Codes,	Hostility	to	
	
The	argument	above,	that	there	is	an	absence	of	hard	law	in	China	regulating	climate	
change,	much	less	CCS,	fits	into	a	broad	narrative	about	the	role	of	law	in	Chinese	
society.	At	the	highest	level	of	generality,	this	sits	well	with	the	claims	that	there	is	a	
traditional	Chinese	hostility	to	legal	codes	and	law.	Dull	wryly	recounts	the	sixth	
century	B.C.	story	of	Deng	Xi,	a	man	who	sought	to	establish	a	system	of	lawful	
accountability	for	rulers,	only	to	be	executed	for	his	troubles.	Says	Dull,	“when	
looking	for	the	root	causes	of	modern	China’s	low	opinion	of	lawyers,	the	story	of	
Deng	Xi	should	be	examined	for	the	source	of	a	deep	prejudice,	not	against	laws,	but	
against	public	laws	that	could	take	on	a	life	of	their	own	and	be	used	to	challenge	the	
authority	of	official	policies	and	values.”119	
	
Such	approaches,	emphasizing	a	deep	seated	hostility	to	law	in	China	are	also	to	be	
found	in	the	writings	of	contemporary	human	rights	scholars,	and	those	working	in	
related	fields	such	as	criminal	law	and	procedure.	Recounting	appalling	litanies	of	
human	rights	abuses	–	abduction,	unauthorised	detention,	'black	jails',	forced	
abortions	and	sterilizations,	intimidation	of	activists	and	families	of	activists,	
interference	with	lawyers,	're-education	through	labour'	and	so	on	–	the	conclusion	
is	that	such	violations	of	basic	rights	are	suffered	by	millions	of	Chinese	on	an	annual	
basis.	As	Cohen	points	out,	all	these	are	plain	violations	of	the	Chinese	Constitution,	
but	“at	present	the	government	offers	no	effective	means	of	enforcing	constitutional	
protections.”	[xii]120	Nor	is	this	merely	a	matter	of	administrative	omission,	the	State	
is	actively	complicit	in	such	violations:	“the	police	have	mastered	the	range	of	
lawless	black	arts,	and	the	procuracy	and	the	courts	have	too	often	proved	
accommodating.”	[ix]121	For	Western	lawyers,	the	position	of	the	Courts	is	central.	
Writing	in	the	context	of	the	criminal	law,	Cohen	notes	that	“the	courts	...have	often	
had	difficulty	fairly	applying	[the	law].	Party	interference,	corruption,	local	
protectionism	and	social	networks	have	all	led	to	distorted	applications	of	the	law.”																																																									118	ibid	723.	See	further	the	discussion	regarding	the	position	of	SASAC	under	the	Law	on	State-Owned	Assets	of	
Enterprises,	at	736.	119	Jack	Dull,	‘The	Deep	Roots	of	Resistance	to	Law	Codes	and	Lawyers	in	China’	in	Karen	Turner-Gottschang,	
James	V	Feinerman	and	R	Kent	Guy	(eds),	The	limits	of	the	rule	of	law	in	China	(University	of	Washington	Press	
2000)	328–9.	Emphasis	added.		120	Jerome	A	Cohen,	‘Foreword:	Lawlessness	in	China’	in	Xu	Youyu	and	Hua	Ze	(eds),	In	the	shadow	of	the	rising	
dragon:	stories	of	repression	in	the	new	China	(Palgrave	Macmillan	2013).	121	ibid.	
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[x]122	Indeed,	at	the	time	of	writing,	Zhou	Qiang,	President	of	the	Supreme	People’s	
Court,	denounced	the	idea	of	judicial	independence,	urging	higher	court	officials	to	
“bare	your	swords	towards	false	western	ideals	like	judicial	independence.”123	
		
Mattei	stresses	the	dangers	of	slipping	into	stereotyped	views	of	Chinese	law,	that	
“traditional	culture	disparaged	law,	that	Chinese	law	was	devoid	of	concepts	of	
rights,	and	that	the	domination	of	law	by	political	considerations	was	and	still	is	
viewed	as	legitimate	in	the	Confucian	tradition.”[37]124	Instead,	the	alternative	
approach	is	to	seek	to	understand	the	“different	structural	nature	of	law	in	
[China]”[37]125,	with	a	key	hint	being	provided	by	which	pattern	of	law	comes	out	
second	in	the	competition	–	in	the	case	of	China,	likely	to	be	political	law.		
	
	
b) Administrative	Measures,	and	the	Rule	of	Law	
	
The	preference	for	administrative	fiat	in	place	of	ordinary	law	is	evident	in	the	case	
of	Chinese	climate	law.	This	is	not	to	criticize	either	its	scope	or	effectiveness.	The	
argument	can	easily	be	made	that	Chinese	climate	action	is	at	least	as	powerful,	as	
extensive	as	other	more	rule	based	regimes.	However,	pace	Wang,	the		issue	is	less	
one	of	brute	effectiveness,	than	normative.	The	key	shortcoming	of	non-legislative	
rule	making	is	routinely	identified	as	one	of	epistemic	accessible.	The	rules	governing	
a	polity	should	promulgated	as	public	knowledge	so	that	the	demos	can	scrutinise,	
criticise,	internalize	and	plan	for	it,	and	“use	it	as	a	framework	for	their	plans	and	
expectations	and	for	settling	their	disputes	with	others.”126	Rules	should	be	made	in	
public		and	not	in	obscure	bureaucratic	contexts.	Additionally,	the	institutions	of	
state,	including	the	courts,	“should	be	available	to	ordinary	people	to	uphold	their	
rights,	settle	their	disputes,	and	protect	them	against	abuses	of	public	and	private	
power.”127	Rules	should	be	clear	and	determinate,	such	that	official	interpretations	
do	not	leave	citizens	subject	to	official	whims.	At	the	heart	of	this	latter	point	is	the	
need	of	judicial	independence,	executive	accountability,	the	absence	of	corruption,	
and	so	on.	
	
Viewing	Chinese	environmental	and	climate	regulation	in	the	light	of	the	rule	of	law,	
it	is	not	a	surprising	to	conclude	that	it	is	an	inadequate	regime.	At	the	highest	level	
of	abstraction	the	difficulties	of	China	to	cohere	with	the	strictures	of	this	principle	
are	well	documented.128	Indeed,	when	subjected	to	the	various	factors	and	criteria	
of	the	World	Justice	Project	China	performs	remarkably	poorly	for	a	jurisdiction	of	its																																																									122	ibid.	123	Lucy	Hornby,	‘China’s	Top	Judge	Denounces	Judicial	Independence’	Financial	Times	(17	January	2017).	124	Mattei	(n	14).	125	ibid.	126	Waldron	(n	30).	127	ibid.	128	For	indicative	surveys,	see	Dingjian	Cai	and	Chen	’guang	Wang	(eds),	China’s	Journey	toward	the	Rule	of	Law:	
Legal	Reform,	1978-2008	(Brill	2010);		Karen	Turner-Gottschang,	James	V	Feinerman	and	R	Kent	Guy	(eds),	The	
Limits	of	the	Rule	of	Law	in	China	(University	of	Washington	Press	2000).	
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wealth	and	sophistication	–	80th	out	of		113	surveyed	states	overall,	sandwiched	
between	Burkina	Faso	and	Zambia.	Whilst	performing	well	in	fields	such	as	order	and	
security,	and		civil	justice,	its	constraints	on	government	powers,	regulatory	
enforcement,	and	fundamental	rights	protection	are	negligible.129	Such	a	system	in	
which	the	rule	of	politics	dominates	so	decisively	over	that	of	law	is	deeply	inimical	
to	the	ideals	of	the	rule	of	law.	Scholars	such	as	Tamanaha	have	termed	this	the		
rule	by	law.130	Whereas	the	traditional	understood	rule	of	law	elevates	law	from	
politics,	such	that	it	stands	in	a	position	of	equidistance	from	all	people	and	
institutions,	the	rule	by	law	is	deploys	law	as	nothing	more	than	a	instrument	of	
political	will.	Law	in	this	sense	is	unidirectional	in	that	it	is	a	tool	by	which	the	state	
can	exercise	dominion	over	its	citizens	without	it	ever	being	able	to	exercise	similar	
control	over	the	state.	The	enforcement	of	environmental	law	generally,	and	in	
respect	of	the	SOEs	which	will	operate	so	decisively	in	the	context	of	CCS,	
demonstrate	precisely	this.	
	
	
c) Enforcement	
	
The	“airpocalypses”	of	extreme	air	pollution	events	suffered	by	China	are	now	
annual	events,	making	clear	to	global	audiences	that	the	environment	of	China	has	
not	been	fundamentally	improved	by	its	corpus	of	environmental	law	and	policy.131	
The	causes	of	this	ineffectiveness	are	numerous132	–	competences	to	make	and	
implement	environmental	policies	are	broadly	dispersed	among	ministries	and	
agencies	creating	inconsistent	approaches	which	hamper	compliance.133	Pivotal	
instruments	such	as	the	Environmental	Protection	Law	have	not	been	amended	
since	1989	meaning	that	many	of	its	provisions	are	outdated	and	simplistic.	The	core	
task	of	affecting	entities’	behaviour	will	not	be	achieved,	for	example,	when	the	
benefits	of	non-compliance	are	greater	than	the	cost	of	penalties.134	
	
As	discussed	above,	law	has	not	always	been	the	vehicle	by	which	public	behaviour	
has	been	modelled	in	China,	and	the	concept	of	the	rule	of	law	has	never	been	fully	
accepted	by	the	Chinese	state.135	In	the	place	of	law,	other	consideration,	often		
political	or	ideological	have	mediated	the	application	of	law,136	a	particular	instance	
of	which	are	the	informal	guanxi	networks.137	In	an	instance	of	drafting	
straightforwardly	antithetical	to	the	rule	of	law,	Chinese	laws	are	often	drafted	at	a																																																									129	JC	Botero,	M	Agrast	and	A	Ponce,	World	Justice	Project	-	Rule	of	Law	Index	2016	(The	World	Justice	Project	
2016).	130	Brian	Z	Tamanaha,	On	the	Rule	of	Law:	History,	Politics,	Theory	(Cambridge	University	Press	2004)	3.	131	Wang	(n	36)	350.	132	ibid.	352;	McElwee	(n	19)	3;	Shi	(n	49)	182.	133	McElwee	(n	19)	9.	134	Shi	(n	49)	183.	135	Wang	(n	36)	532-3;	Pitman	B.	Potter,	The	Chinese	Legal	System:	Globalization	and	Local	Legal	Culture	
(Routledge	2001)	7.	136	McElwee	(n	19)	4-5.	137	ibid	8;	Pitman	B.	Potter	(n	94)	7,	30.	
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high	level	of	generality	which	provides	the	interpretive	space	for	corruptive	
practices.138	In	particular,	local	authorities	have	sufficient	flexibility	in	the	
interpretation	and	implementation	of	legislation	which	undermines	certainty	of	
law.139	It	is	by	the	use	of	guanxi	rather	than	transactional	bribery	that	decision	
making	is	influenced,	a	system	which	weakens	environmental	law,	legal	authority,	
and	the	prestige	of	the	judiciary.140	
	
Economic	development	is	often	considered	to	be	of	higher	importance	when	it	
conflicts	with	environmental	laws	and	regulations.141	Both	national	and	local	
governments	have	their	own	economic	development	goals	and	needs	in	mind,	and	
routinely	use	pressure	to	obstruct	enforcement.142	When	environmental	obligations	
are	to	be	enforced	locally,	authorities	may	be	discouraged	from	enforcing	them	in	
the	belief	that	the	same	may	not	occur	in	competing	jurisdictions,	thereby	putting	
their	local	industries	at	a	competitive	disadvantage.143	In	this	way,	the	geographic	
fragmentation	of	environmental	responsibility	combined	with	economic	
considerations	can	discourage	authorities	from	enforcing	the	rules	and	instead	
defaulting	to	local	protectionism.144	
	
Institutionally,	environmental	enforcement	agencies	face	difficulties	to	undertake	
their	duties	due	to	their	bureaucratic	connections	with	environmental	protection	
departments	of	local	governments,	whose	staff	and	resources	are	controlled	by	the	
local	seat	of	the	People’s	Government.145	Primary	responsibility	for	environmental	
protection	is	with	the	local	authorities,	and	despite	reporting	obligations	there	are	
opportunities	to	not	follow	the	environmental	laws.146	The	local	People’s	
Government	may	prioritise	economic	development	over	environmental	protection,	
and	in	some	cases,	the	environmental	protection	departments	may	even	become	
accomplices	in	illegal	construction	projects.147	Refusing	to	follow	the	requests	of	the	
government	and	insisting	on	enforcing	the	law	may	lead	to	dismissal	of	the	
environmental	officials.148	More	generally,	routine	problems	of	resourcing	arise	–
environmental	protection	departments	have	limited	resources	to	enforce	the	law;149	
and	they	have	difficulties	to	discover	polluters	in	their	jurisdiction	in	a	timely	
manner,	and	challenges	in	collecting	sufficient	evidence	to	present	in	court	due	to	
																																																								138	McElwee	(n	19)	8;	Peerenboom	(n	30)	251.	139	Peerenboom	(n	31).	140	Wang	(n	36)	533;	McElwee	(n	19)	6.	141	McElwee	(n	20)	6;	Potter	(n	42)	159.	142	Wang	(n	37)	533.	143	McElwee	(n	20)	7.	144	Shi	(n	50)	184;	McElwee	(n	20)	7;	.Zhenmin	Wang	and	Kai	Tu,	‘Chinese	Constitutional	Dynamics:	A	Decennial	
Review’	in	Albert	HY	Chen	(ed),	Constitutionalism	in	Asia	in	the	Early	Twenty-First	Century	(Cambridge	University	
Press	2014)	137.	145	Wang	(n	37)	533-4.	146	McElwee	(n	20)	5-6.	147	Wang	(n	37)	534.	148	ibid.	149	ibid;	McElwee	(n	20).	
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lack	of	appropriate	equipment	to	monitor	activities.150	Where	illegal	construction	
projects	are	supported	by	government	agencies	and	local	governments	behind	the	
scenes,	it	is	extremely	difficult	for	environmental	offices	to	enforce	the	law.151	
	
As	regards	establishing	liability,	there	are	problems	both	substantive	and	procedural.	
Company	law	provides	a	not	inconsiderable	loophole	in	that	while	polluting	
companies	can	face	civil	liability	for	harming	the	environment,	there	is	liability	for	
directors.152	As	regards	enforcement	mechanisms,	Gibbs	notes	that	China’s	Tort	
Liability	Law	provides	enforcement	avenues	for	individuals.153	If	there	is	loss	or	
damage	that	CCS	causes,	these	laws	can	provide	for	remedies.154	Against	that,	there	
is	a	swathe	of	Chinese	environmental	law	literature	that	runs	in	the	opposite	
direction.	Environmental	public	interest	litigation	has	struggled	to	make	progress.155	
The	reasons	include	the	tradition	of	having	citizens,	legal	persons	or	other	groups	
who	are	direct	stakeholders	as	plaintiffs,	and	this	being	resistant	to	change.	Also,	
there	is	some	concern	that	the	system	would	appear	to	undermine	the	government	
due	to	expanding	democratic	values.156	The	legislation	on	defending	environmental	
rights	is	described	as	weak,	lacking	important	procedural	elements,	such	as	rules	on	
responsibility	to	provide	evidence,	determination	of	causation	and	on	the	scope	of	
damages.157	The	laws	have	underdeveloped	areas,	which	has	caused	many	disputes	
to	languish	without	a	resolution,	and	some	to	end	up	to	violent	clashes	over	
pollution.158	Polluting	industries	are	sometimes	protected	by	local	governments,	
meaning	that	impartial	judgments	are	hard	to	obtain.159	Often	defence	of	
environmental	rights	is	also	more	challenging	due	to	the	quality	of	the	judges	in	the	
judicial	system,	including	their	lack	education	and	systematic	training	in	
environmental	law,	and	sufficient	knowledge	about	how	to	handle	pollution	cases.	
The	independence	of	judges	is	disrupted	by	central	and	local	government	
involvement	through	personal	relations,	and	appointment	and	funding	powers.160	In	
this	way,	environmental	rights	suffer	from	a	negative	impact	caused	by	judges	
relying	on	civil	cases	where	they	lack	specific	knowledge	on	how	to	approach	
violations	of	environmental	rights.	Recently	established	local	special	environmental	
courts	have	been	established	to	tackle	the	issues	resulting	from	lack	of	special	
																																																								150	Wang	(n	37)	534.	151	ibid	545.	152	Shi	(n	50)	182-3.	153		Gibbs	(n	84)	32.	154		ibid.	155	Wang	(n	37)	537-538.	For	a	more	positive	assessment,	see	James	Thornton	of	Client	Earth,	2015	UKELA	
Garner	Lecture	“Can	we	Catch-Up?	How	the	UK	is	falling	behind	on	Environmental	Law”.	Copy	on	file	with	the	
author.	156	ibid.	157	ibid	538-539.	158	ibid.	159	ibid	539-540.	160	Shi	(n	50)	171;	Pitman	B.	Potter	(n	133)	32;	Wang	(n	37)	541;	Wang	and	Tu	(n	142)	136-7.	
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knowledge,	and	the	method	has	shown	success.161	That	said,	the	lack	of	specialised	
knowledge	on	environmental	law	concerns	not	only	judges	but	also	bureaucrats.162	
	
	
d) Corruption	
	
Corruption	as	regards	Chinese	SOEs	is	“widespread,	and	accompanied	by	
institutionalised	and	pervasive	cronyism.”163	President	Xi	Jinping	has	run	an	anti-
corruption	campaign	from	2012	onwards,164	but	corruption	remains	endemic,	and	
there	have	been	struggles	to	carry	out	fundamental	reforms.165	The	factors	enabling	
corruption	within	SOEs	include	the	“complexity	of	the	SOE	operation,	
decentralisation	of	managerial	power	allowing	direct	control	over	distribution	of	
resources,	and	the	ability	to	make	decisions	generating	corrupt	benefits.	Rampant	
corruption	is	further	enabled	by	weak	supervision	systems	and	opportunities	for	
corruption	created	both	by	the	system	and	the	use	of	legitimate	managing	
power.”166		
	
For	the	purposes	of	CCS,	these	mechanisms	to	extract	rents	from	governments	risk	
undermining	key	aspects	of	CCS.	Whilst	SOEs	may	align	with	the	interests,	goals,	and	
priorities	of	the	political	leadership	by	developing	CCS	projects,	they	may	be	
relatively	indifferent	to	aspects	of	project	integrity	which	the	leadership	are	similarly	
indifferent	to.	Poor	site	selection,	monitoring,	CO2	purity,	or	any	number	of	other	
systemic	defects	may	well	go	undetected	and	even	tacitly	supported	in	an	
environment	in	which	firms	obtain	special	advantages	through	corrupt	access	to	
government,	and	where	there	is	deep	convergence	of	interests	between	managerial	
elites	in	the	party-state	and	business.167		
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5. Conclusion	
	
In	the	concluding	chapter	to	this	volume	the	editors	observe	that	one	of	law’s	key	
functions	is	to	provide	the	means	to	resolve	conflicting	interests,	to	articulate,	“the	
framework	for	reconciling	the	complex	issues	and	relationships	involved	[in	
greenhouse	gas	reductions].	This	reinforces	the	importance	of	developing	effective	
legal	and	regulatory	structures.”	If	one	agrees	that	law	is	a	zone	of	institutionalised	
contestation	between	competing	societal	interests,	the	foregoing	severely	questions	
whether	this	is	a	universal	truth,	or	one	particular	to	certain	legal	systems.	Certainly,	
the	case	cannot	be	easily	made	that	Chinese	law	mediates	effectively	between	the	
various	stakeholders	potentially	implicated	in	a	CCS	project.	That	case	is	yet	harder	
to	sustain	in	relations	between	aggrieved	individuals,	and	the	State	and	its	proxies.		
	
One	way	to	understand	this	would	be	to	argue	that	there	is	in	China	simply	an	
absence	of	law	tout	court.	One	might	draw	upon	Gibbs	and	her	finding	that,	having	
measured	the	Chinese	CCS	regime	against	her	four	criteria,	there	is	a	need	for	a	
permitting	regime	to	be	established,	relevant	standards	to	be	developed,	including	
monitoring	and	verification	standards,	for	existing	enforcement	mechanisms	to	be	
adapted	or	new	mechanisms	developed	for	CCS,	for	the	roles	and	responsibilities	of	
the	relevant	authorities	to	be	clarified,	and	for	attitudes	toward	enforcement	and	
compliance	to	be	changed	to	ensure	effective	operation	of	CCS	in	China.168	All	this	is	
undoubtedly	correct,	but	‘mere’	rulemaking	would	not	address	the	problem	in	a	
legal	system	in	which	tradition	and	politics	play	as	significant	as	they	do	in	China.	As	
Mattei	notes,	“one	should	not	confuse	the	rule	of	traditional	law	with	the	absence	of	
law	or	even	with	the	absence	of	formal	legal	institutions.	In	the	rule	of	traditional	
law	formal	legal	institutions	do	exist,	but	their	working	rule	is	different	from	what	we	
are	used	to	in	Western	societies.”169	The	deficit	in	this	sense	is	then	not	the	absence	
of	law,	but	the	perceived	shortcomings	of	the	mode	of	law.	In	one	sense,	the	story	of	
China’s	climate	regime,	and	its	CCS	regime,	is	one	of	the	abundance	of	bureaucratic	
agreements,	plans,	and	schemes	that	have	a	degree	of	effectiveness	that	more	
conventionally	‘legal’	regimes	might	envy.	Such	is	the	interlocking	web	of	relations	
that	the	Chinese	State,	SOEs,	and	local	governments	have	between	one	another,	
that	the	‘absence’	of	law	can	be	(and	often	in	the	literature	is),	eased	out	of	sight.	
This	however	is	to	do	an	injustice	to	the	weight	of	the	distinction	between	the	rule	
of	law,	and	the	rule	by	law.	The	latter’s	elevation	of	politics	above	law	serves	to	
allow	the	state	can	exercise	uncontested	might	over	its	citizens.	For	the	purposes	of	
enforcing	environmental	law	in	China,	and	in	particular	respect	of	the	SOEs	which	
will	operate	so	decisively	in	the	context	of	CCS,	there	is	little	prospect	of	a	CCS	
regime	which	both	enables	its	widespread	deployment	and	protects	the	broader	
interests	of	the	environment	and	citizens.	
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